Special Situation – JAKK

JAKK is doing a partial tender offer.

Basically, if you own less than 100 shares, the company will buy them from you for $20/share at the end of June. Now of course nothing is ever risk free, but considering JAKK has plenty of cash on hand to self finance this offer, this is about as close as it gets.

I was able to buy 198 (99 in each of 2 accounts) shares at an average price of 18.145 for a cash outlay of $3,593 + $14 in commissions = $3,607.

At the end of June assuming all goes as planned I will receive $3,960 or a return of $353. That is a touch over a 10% return in about a month, or an annualized gain of ~120%.

Small dollars, but big percentages… and who doesn’t like free money?

JNGW – Special Situation Completed

About a week ago the payout for the JNGW special situation FINALLY went through. The shares were actually delisted back on March 30th, so for the last 6 or 7 weeks I have been left wondering if, when, and how I would be rewarded for my investment. The company rudely didn’t issue a press release with that information. I unsuccessfully called the company on several occasions asking for information on timing and had been left doubting the wisdom in investing in a Chinese special situation.

Thankfully the situation resolved itself for a 16% return.

The time i spent wondering / worrying if I would get my money back reminded me that special situations are not “free money.” Even though the market risk is largely eliminated, you still have to worry about company specific risk such as a management team that absconds with your money. The risk of this happening in the US is pretty low, but in China markets are obviously not as tightly regulated as they are here.

VITN: “Timing Isn’t Everything for Value Investors”

A quick article from the WSJ reminding us that the patient investor will be rewarded eventually.

Timing Isn’t Everything for Value Investors

By SPENCER JAKAB

They say good things come to those who wait. Trouble is, most people can’t, or won’t, stick around for long—at least not when it comes to their money.

That helps explain a great mystery of investing—why, despite the hundreds of millions of dollars spent each year on advice and management fees, a free lunch of sorts has persisted in the form of value investing.

For example, Brandes Institute sliced U.S. stocks into 10 deciles by value characteristics. From 1980 to 2010, the cheapest outperformed the dearest by 575%.

Such an opportunity shouldn’t persist, but it does. That is probably because there are bad periods for value stocks of three or more years interspersed among the good ones. Those are long enough for fickle fund investors to dump their managers, often forcing them to sell holdings.

The bipolar years since the financial crisis have been one of those dry stretches with either everything languishing or “risk-on” rallies mainly lifting growth stocks. With Greece coming to a boil with a crucial election next month, value stocks may once again get the attention they deserve. The years after long periods of poor relative performance are some of the best for patient value managers.

Value investors have dubbed this opportunity “time arbitrage,” and it is high time for it to work its magic. Russell Investment ranks the relative performance of its five main growth and value indexes each year. The last time a value index ranked on top and a growth index on bottom was the awful year of 2008. From 2009 through 2011, and so far this year, a growth index was the best performer and a value index came in last.

Consider value investor Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Its three worst years of investment performance relative to the broad market came in 1967, 1980 and 1999. Its cumulative outperformance relative to the S&P 500 over the following three-year periods was 49%, 102% and 48%, respectively.

In times like these, with value in the doghouse, it isn’t only the likes of Mr. Buffett who can rack up gaudy numbers. Individuals with no impatient investment committee to answer to also have an edge over fund managers. Time is on their side.

More on Cruise Lines: Tailwinds and Valuation

In the last post, I made the case for stability in the cruise industry.

Now I’ll talk a bit about tailwinds and valuation.

Sell side analysts talk about occupancy, available passenger days, net yields and several other industry metrics that are likely useful while trying to pinpoint short term earnings potential. However, I am not interested in the cruise lines because of the short term earnings potential. I am interested in them because I think they are stable businesses with little risk of change over the next ten years or so. In the shorter term I really have no idea what will happen with prices. I think the equity is cheap now, but it is certainly at risk of decline due to a global consumer spending slow down, a terrorist attack, an out break of bird flu, an accident at sea, a spike in oil prices, and any other number of factors.

However, the above mentioned risks have always been present, and they will always be present in the future. I really don’t think there is any way to invest around them.

It is worth noting however, that in the past, despite all of the previously mentioned risks which have manifested themselves at various points, the two companies still managed to post 10 year average ROEs of 8.2% (RCL) and 10.9% (CCL). These averages have also been significantly impacted by the last few years of the great recession, suggesting that a true normalized ROE number would be higher, rather than lower.

Of course, historical ROE numbers are useless if you think the future of the industry is at risk, but I don’t. In fact, I think the future of the industry is brighter than its past as there are a number of tailwinds developing. First, and perhaps most obvious, is the aging population in the US. The average age of cruise passengers is over 50 years old, and there is a significant senior segment. Second, historically cruising has been a mostly North American phenomenon, but that is changing. According to RCL’s recent investor presentation, 3.3% of the American & Canadian population are cruise customers, while only 1.1% of Europeans, .2% of Latin Americans, and .1% of the population of the Asia/Pacific region are. That provides a long runway of growth potential as the situation in Europe stabilizes and other regions become more prosperous. Additionally, new destinations are coming online as is evidenced by the fact that in 2007 50% of RCL’s cruises were Caribbean, and in 2012 only 42% were. Furthermore, vessels are becoming more fuel efficient, and capacity growth is slowing as management teams have indicated they will be more focused on strengthening their balance sheets and focusing on ROIC rather than blind expansion as they had been in the past.

All of those tailwinds are great… but I don’t want to pay for them. And at today’s prices, I am not. Today I am paying for the assumption that consumers will never go on cruises the way they used to, ships will crash, and terrorists will attack cruise ships. I am happy to buy that assumption.

RCL is trading for .61x book, and CCL is trading for 1.04 book. With average ROEs of 8.2 and 10.9 respectively, at these prices with a cost of capital or hurdle rate of 10%, intrinsic value of the shares can be estimated at 82% of book for RCL (8.2% / 10% )and 109% of book for CCL (10.9% / 10%). For RCL that implies an intrinsic value of over $32 and for CCL a price around $33. This is obviously a very simple valuation, but in a business whose long term prospects are as stable as i believe the cruise business to be, simple is all you need.

I believe these estimates are conservative for a few reasons. First, book values for cruise lines are understated due to the effects of inflation. The ships are typically deprecated over a 30 year period, but a new build costs significantly more than the carrying value of the old ships. Second, as mentioned, the 10 year average ROE number that I used is likely understated. Third, the previously listed tailwinds should all benefit revenue in the future, meaning even higher ROE. Additionally, it is worth noting that historically P/B for RCL was mostly above 1.5x and for CCL mostly above 2x with the exception of the post 9/11 years and great recession years.

In summary, I don’t know what will happen in the short term, but for an individual investor that does not have to pander to the whims of impatient customers that expect quarterly results the way most institutional managers do, I think that the cruise lines will perform very nicely. At these prices RCL has an almost 25% margin of safety vs a low estimate of intrinsic value, meaning the margin of safety is probably closer to 40%.

Disclosure – establishing a long in RCL and hoping to add more lower.

Cruise Industry at a Glance (RCL / CCL)

Buffett has often said that when valuing a company he tries to picture what the value line sheet will look like in ten years. The implication is that Buffett is only interested in companies that are resistant to change. Now, I am not suggesting that the cruise lines have the growth prospects of a Buffett company, but I do think that the industry will prove to be resistant to change, which makes it easier to value. In fact, short of Richard Branson or Sirgei Brin succeeding in the commercialization of space travel on a grand scale, I really can’t see how the cruise business will change at all in the future.

The cruise business is a good business with high barriers to entry. Competition within the industry is centered on price and service, and as usual where price is a factor, economies of scale matter. RCL and CCL respectively control 24% and 49% of the worldwide cruise industry through a variety of branded subsidiaries that are meant to appeal to different price points, geographies, and cultures. RCL and CLL are able to leverage one operational framework as well as spread their risks across many boats and clearly benefit from these economies of scale. What this means is that the existing power players could easily move to undercut the prices of new entrants or existing upstarts if a threat developed.

Additionally, cruising is an industry where reputation is important. Feeding, housing, entertaining and otherwise caring for hundreds of people while at sea is an impressive logistical feat. Consumers are likely to go with a name they know and trust – perhaps a friend had a great vacation on XYZ cruise lines – rather than try their luck with an unproven upstart that may be thought of as more likely to have problems at sea a consumer is likely to also go with XYZ cruise line. Because of the above any new entrant would likely need to be branded (example: “W Cruises” brought to you by the W Hotel or something along those lines that implies quality) or really access only a small niche within the broader market.

Further protecting the established norms is the fact that global port capacity is limited, and port operators may be reluctant to deal with new entrants for fear of angering their larger clients. If there is limited dock space, and you are the port operator, would you be more likely to work the port schedule around the new company that operates one or 2 ships that come to port once or twice a month, or with the company that operates a half dozen ships that come to port 10 times a month? The same can be said about the outside vendors that cruise ships partner with to provide “excursions” for their guests. If you are in the business of taking cruise ship passengers on jet ski or horseback rides, you would be more inclined to deal with the companies whose ships come to port most often, making it more difficult for an upstart to provide add on experiences for their guests.

Also a thought, although I’m not sure how relevant it is due to the declining importance of travel agents as a whole, but I would think that people going on cruises would be more likely to use a travel agent than the average traveler due to the fact that cruise customers tend to be older (assuming less likely to book online) and that cruises have multiple moving parts between flights, transport to the dock, the cruise itself, and then add on activities. Travel agents would likely be incented to push cruises from the major operators in some sort of rewards plan.

As for why the cruise lines never priced each other to death airline style, I think there are two main reasons. The first is that the industry is differentiated vertically, meaning that there are high end cruises, low end cruises, and everything in between. On the high end as with many things considered “luxury” pricing cruises higher helps attract a certain clientele. For this well heeled clientele discounting prices is a bad thing. When one has an elitist attitude, a lower price makes the experience more accessible for those in a lower social strata which the elitist does not wish to be associated with, and these customers will gladly pay up to ensure they are only surrounded by people who they view as social equals. On the low end, value conscious consumers book far in advance trying to lock in the best price, allowing the cruise operator to adjust pricing upward based on remaining supply for the next round of buyers. Of course as time until departure gets low prices adjust downward to ensure a full boat.

The second reason is that cruise offerings are differentiated horizontally, meaning that there are many different cruise niches. The obvious here is geography, but other niches such as black tie dinners versus adventure excursions are also plentiful. Additionally, different ships are pitched as different experiences with the net effect being that cruise experiences are not as commoditized as one may first assume.

All of the above is enough to get me interested in taking a look at what the future of the industry may hold, and what valuation currently looks like.

More on that in the coming days.

Gannon Blind Stock Valuation 2

Geoff Gannon posted a blind stock valuation contest over at Guru Focus.

In this exercise Geoff gives his readers some information on an anonymous company’s income statement and balance sheet and asks readers to submit an estimate of what the company is worth. There is no industry data etc, so this is a purely quantitative exercise.

Take a look at the details and submit your thoughts to Geoff here.

If you would like to see my thoughts, keep reading.
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IM in 2 minutes. Watch List.

Ingram Micro is the largest wholesale distributor of information technology products in the world.  The company has been around since 1979, and completed over 20 acquisitions in the last 10 years focusing primarily on global expansion.   According to their 10K, they add value to their customers through adding visibility to the supply chain allowing resellers and suppliers to improve their execution.

I first noticed the stock because it is a net net: current assets – total liabilities > market cap.

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Locking in Gains and Avoiding Round Trips (PETS and KSWS)

PETS reported earnings this morning, and while their quarter beat expectations, their full year came in with EPS at .80/share vs .92 last year. The stock is selling off hard on the news – currently down 20% – although the stock was up 7.5% on Friday as short sellers rushed to cover their position before earnings.

At its late Friday price of $14 the stock was trading at ~17x its T12M earnings – by no means an “exuberant” level for an asset light company with a history of high returns on equity and share holder friendly actions, but it is hard to not kick myself for not taking some profits given that as of Friday my investment had returned 35%, and today it has returned 8%.

The long term investment thesis here is that veterinarians still control ~70% of the pet med market, and over time they are going to lose ground. Simply said, the vets are fragmented and won’t be able to compete on price (and convenience for OTC meds) with an online retailer. PETS has been under pressure as WMT and other brick and mortar retailers enter the space, and there are admittedly limited barriers to entry for other online aspirants. Margins will likely shrink over time, but even at lower margins the asset light business model will lead to high ROEs. This thesis is still intact, so I am not about to exit my position today – I feel comfortable with the long term investment here.

However, I think that this was a case where I should have ignored the part of me that likes the buy and hold / minimize transaction costs and I should have taken some off the table. In the first 3Qs of the year (they consider today’s earnings to be the close of the 2012 year) PETS had earned .22, .19, and .19 per share or a total of .60. In FY11 the company earned .92/share, so in order to just meet the year over year comparison the company needed a blow out quarter of .32/share. Now, it is not impossible for the company to have had a blow out quarter… they have historically been a consistent purchaser of their own stock reducing the denominator in the EPS equation, and the warm weather likely pulled some sales forward. However, there have only been a few occasions in their history where they have had EPS jump by more than .10 from quarter to quarter, and with a 35% profit in a short period of time, the risk reward equation favored taking a profit.

Similarly, KSWS has now become a round tripper for me and is currently sitting on my books as a loss while it was a 40% gain just 6 weeks ago. Again – I think the thesis here is intact – the company has brand value and a growing international business. For decades the company returned industry high ROEs with its “classic” white shoe, which has gone out of style over the last few years. However, all styles are cyclical and it is not hard to imagine the clean white sneaker coming back to some degree. I first bought this stock in December when tax loss selling had really beaten it down, and given that that was part of the thesis, I should have been quicker to take some profit.

Both of these situations have me thinking back to Mike Burry’s style of investing – which at times resembled “trading” more than investing. Burry had a rule that if a stock was up 50% in under a year he would sell half of his position. At the time, Burry was investing in a market that for the most part went up in a straight line with limited volatility. Investors today are investing in a more volatile range bound market where macro fears can over take value at any given time, and the investing public is apt to change their mind and dump stocks across the board on any given headline out of Europe.

Overall, I more prefer the buy and hold mentality due to the reduced transaction costs and tax benefits. However, there are shades of gray with everything, and in the 2 cases above, I think I should have leaned toward locking in the profits. When I buy a stock, I am typically buying it because I think that it will double within 5 years leading to a 15% annualized gain. If an investor can achieve 15% annual gains over any stretch of time he or she is part of a pretty respectable crowd.

Burry had a rule that required him to sell half a position if it moved up 50% in less than a year. In this more volatile market, I think it makes sense to sell half a position if it moves up 33% in less than half a year. If i am shooting for 15% a year over a long stretch of time, locking in 33% in six months equates to annualized gains of 66% which will go a long way toward reaching the 15% goal.

I think this rule also especially makes sense given the types of companies that I find myself interested in… in many cases they have high short interests as they are in the midst of some sort of turn around or temporary problem. In cases such as these the slightest bit of positive news can send the stock soaring as the weak handed shorts rush to cover, but turn arounds and temporary problems can take several quarters or even years to sort themselves out, so the shorts will likely be resetting their positions when the technicals appear to have evened out after the squeeze. This especially applies going into an event like earnings. Of course, if the earnings are better than expected, I will be kicking myself for having locked in the profit by reducing my stake, but again, it comes down to risk vs reward and not being greedy.

Food for thought next time I have a 33% gain inside of 6 months.

Electronic Arts – Watchlist

I first thought about EA when i was looking into WWE and gaining a better understanding of the value that sports have in terms of content. Basically with sports you have content that is only really relevant in real time and a passionate fan base. A great combination.

I started thinking about how this content was distributed, and remembered the EA Sports video games like Madden Football and NHL Hockey. I reasoned that these were strong franchises with dedicated customers that likely upgraded every few years if not every year to keep their gaming experience relevant to real world sports. For example, players being traded, new rookies making a splash in the league, and other changes to real world sports will all motivate consumers to purchase the new game each year regardless of technological advances in the games themselves.
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